Team logic is the logic of functional dependencies. We define the basic logical operations of team logic, establish its relationship with independence friendly and second order logic, and give it a game theoretic characterization.
Introduction
Let a vocabulary 1 L and an L-structure M with universe M be given. In this paper we study functional dependencies in M. This is in contrast to the traditional approach in logic of studying relational dependencies in M. Our atomic dependence relations state the existence of a functional dependence without giving any definition for the function that carries the dependence. This gives the whole topic a second order flavor. It seems to the author that although functional dependence in databases has been studied (starting with [Ar74] ), a general theory of more complex types of dependence is new. (For a more detailed recent study, see [Vä07] .) Our theory is based on [Ho 1 97b] and [VäHo 1 ∞].
If L has an n-ary function symbol f , there is immediately an apparent dependence relation in M, namely the dependence of each a = f M (a 1 , . . . , a n ) on a 1 , . . . , a n . If the function f M is constant, the dependence is of a singular kind, not commonly called dependence on a 1 , . . . , a n at all. On the other hand, if the function is one to one, we have a dependence that is so perfect that it can even be reversed. In this case dependence is carried by a function that has a name in the vocabulary. In general we have completely abstract functions carrying the dependence with no name in the vocabulary and even no definition in the language, what so ever.
If L has an n-ary relation symbol R, there is a relational dependence relation in M, namely the mutual dependence of a 1 , . . . , a n such that (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ R M on each other. However, even if such a relation between the elements a 1 , . . . , a n binds the elements together in an obvious sense, it need not in general be a (functional) dependence in the sense of the current approach.
Team logic is the logic of (functional) dependence. We define the basic concepts of team logic and use it to analyze dependence. The negationfree part of team logic turns out to correspond naturally to independence friendly logic and thereby to the existential part of second order logic. Team logic itself can be seen as being the natural closure of independence friendly logic under (classical) negation. In expressive power team logic is in a natural sense equivalent to full second order logic. We give a game-theoretic characterization of team logic by means of an appropriate EhrenfeuchtFraïssé game.
Agents and teams
An agent is any finite mapping s from a domain dom(s) into M . Elements of dom(s) are called features or fields, sometimes attributes, depending on the application 2 . Unless stated otherwise, to be specific, the domain of an agent is a finite set of natural numbers. The modification s(a/n) of an agent s maps n to a but agrees otherwise with s. The value of a term t, built up from variables x n and symbols of L, on an agent s is the element t s of M defined in the usual way by c s = c M , x n s = s(n), and f t 1 . . . t n s = f M (t 1 s , . . . , t n s ). For this to make sense the domain of s has to contain n whenever x n occurs in t.
Building on [Ho 1 97a] and [Ho 1 97b] we take the position that dependence, just like any other pattern, cannot be manifested by one event, observation or agent (which is our terminology) but needs a series or a group of events, observations or agents. We call these series or groups manifesting dependence teams.
A team (see Figure 1 ) is any set X of agents with the same domain dom(X). Table 1 1. Does a certain gene or gene combination (significantly) determine a given hereditary disease in the sense that a patient with (a fault in) those genes has a high risk of the disease?
2. Is a disease totally dependent on a gene in the sense that every gene combination that (significantly) determines the disease contains that particular gene.
3. Is a gene (merely) dependent on a gene in the sense that the disease is (significantly) determined by some gene combination with the gene but not without.
4. Is a disease totally independent of a gene in the sense that no gene combination that (significantly) determines the disease contains that particular gene.
5. Is a gene (merely) independent of a gene in the sense that some gene combinations (significantly) determine the disease without containing that particular gene. Figure 2 . A piece of a team of genomes.
Team 2 Game history team: Imagine a game, any game. Game moves are the features of this team, plays are the agents, and a collection of plays is a team. Thus a player is identified with his or her behavior in the game. It may be relevant to know answers to the following kinds of questions:
1. What is the strategy that a player (e.g. "Nature") is following, or is he or she following any strategy at all?
2. Is a player using information about his or her (or other players') moves that he or she is committed not to use?
Team 3 Every formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) of any logic and structure M give rise to the team of all assignments that satisfy ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) in M. This is a definable team and perhaps the most obvious team arising in logic. It may manifest functional dependencies on the structure, and depending on the logic, these dependencies can or cannot be expresses in the logic. 
Dependence types
Our starting point was the idea that teams can manifest dependencies. The different ways that this happens give rise to the concept of a dependence type 3 that we now define. Some dependence types are of an atomic nature in that they are not decomposed further into smaller dependence types. The atomic types are Table 3 is of type x 3 = x 4 .
• ¬t = t ′ : Every agent s ∈ X satisfies t s = t ′ s . The team of Table 3 is of type ¬x 2 = x 4 .
• Rt 1 . . . t n : Every agent s ∈ X satisfies (t 1 s , . . . , t n s ) ∈ R M . The team of Table 3 is of type x 2 < x 4 .
• ¬Rt 1 . . . t n : Every agent s ∈ X satisfies (t 1 s , . . . , t n s ) / ∈ R M . The team of Table 3 is of type ¬x 4 < x 2 .
• =(t 1 , . . . , t n ): Every two agents s, s ′ ∈ X that satisfy
also satisfy t n s = t n s ′ . This type is called the dependence type. The team of Table 3 is of type =(x 1 , x 2 ) but not of type =(x 2 , x 1 ). There are two special cases. The first is =(t). This is the type of teams in which the value of t is constant. Team 5 above is of type =(reach). The second special case is the type =(). This is the type of all teams what so ever and is given a special symbol ⊤.
• ¬ =(t 1 , . . . , t n ): This is the type of the empty team ∅. This should be distinguished from the type of an "impossible" team, that is, the type which is not the type of any team what so ever. We shall return to this type later. The reason for allowing only the empty team to be of the type ¬ =(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is the following: We want types to be closed downwards. If a non-empty team was of type ¬ =(t 1 , . . . , t n ), there would have to be a singleton team {s} of the same type. But singleton teams are always of type =(t 1 , . . . , t n ). 
The empty team is of every atomic type, in particular both of type t = t ′ and ¬t = t ′ . From atomic dependence types we can build more complex ones with team operations, which are the following:
The team is not of type ϕ. The team of Table 3 is of type ∼ =(x 2 , x 1 ). Note that ∼ Rt 1 . . . t n is quite different from ¬Rt 1 . . . t n . The former says some agent s in the team fails to satisfy (t 1 s , . . . , t n s ) ∈ R M , while the latter says all fail. Even more Table 4 . Two teams in (N, <).
dramatic is the difference between ∼ =(t 1 , . . . , t n ) and ¬ =(t 1 , . . . , t n ). The former says some s and s ′ in the team give the same value to (t 1 , . . . , t n−1 ) but a different value to t n , while the latter says there are no agents in the team at all. Finally ∼ =() is the type of no team. Thus we have two negations, ¬ and ∼, but the former can be applied to atomic types only. Its range of applicability can be extended to what we call ∼-free part of team logic.
• Conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ: The team is both of type ϕ and of type ψ. The team of Table 3 is of type x 3 = x 4 ∧ ¬x 2 = x 4 .
• Tensor ϕ ⊗ ψ: The team is the union of a team of type ϕ and a team of type ψ. Team 5 is of type paints ⊗ welds. This indicates the role of ⊗ in expressing co-operation skills of teams. The team of Table 3 is of type =(x 3 , x 2 ) ⊗ =(x 3 , x 2 ), as Table 4 shows. Note that that team is not of type =(x 3 , x 2 ). So tensor is not idempotent as conjunction is.
• Existential quantifier ∃x n ϕ: The agents s ∈ X can be modified to s(a s /n) in such a way that the team {s(a s /n); s ∈ X} is of type ϕ. The team of Table 3 is of type ∃x 1 (x 1 < x 2 ) and also of type ∃x 5 (x 5 < x 2 ).
• Shriek quantifier !x n ϕ: A team X is of this type if the team of all agents s(a/n), where a ∈ M and s ∈ X, is of type ϕ. The team of Table 3 is of type ! x 1 (x 1 < x 3 ⊗ x 2 < x 1 ). but not of type ! x 1 (x 2 < x 1 ).
More formally:
Definition 3.1. Let L be a vocabulary. The set of types is defined as follows: If t, t ′ , t 1 , . . . , t n are terms of the vocabulary L, and R is a relation symbol in L, then the following are types
If ϕ and ψ are types, then so are:
The concept "team X is of type ϕ" is defined as follows:
• X is of type t = t ′ iff for all s ∈ X(t s = t ′ s ).
• X is of type ¬t = t ′ iff for all s ∈ X(t s = t ′ s ).
• X is of type Rt 1 . . . t n iff for all s ∈ X(t 1 s , . . . , t n s ) ∈ R M .
• X is of type ¬Rt 1 . . . t n iff for all ∈ X(t 1 s , . . . , t n s ) / ∈ R M .
• X is of type =(t 1 , . . . , t n ) iff for all s, s
• X is of type ¬ =(t 1 , . . . , t n ) iff X = ∅.
• X is of type ∼ ϕ iff X is not of type ϕ.
• X is of type ϕ ∧ ψ iff X is both of type ϕ and of type ψ.
• X is of type ϕ ⊗ ψ iff X = Y ∪ Z, where Y is of type ϕ and Z is of type ψ.
• X is of type ∃x n ϕ iff there is a function s → a s from X to M so that the team {s(a s /n); s ∈ X} is of type ϕ.
• X is of type !x n ϕ iff the team {s(a/n) : a ∈ M, s ∈ X} is of type ϕ.
We can define further types from the above ones:
• Disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ: This is the type ∼(∼ ϕ ∧ ∼ ψ), i.e. the type of teams that are of type ϕ or of type ψ (or both).
• Universal quantifier ∀x n ϕ: This is the type ∼ ∃x n ∼ ϕ, i.e. the type of teams X such that whenever the agents s ∈ X are modified to some s(a s /n), then the new team {s(a s /n); s ∈ X} is of type ϕ.
• Implication ϕ → ψ: This is the type ∼ ϕ ∨ ψ.
• Lollipop ϕ −• ψ: This is the type ∼(ϕ ⊗ ∼ ψ), i.e. if whenever it is represented as the union of two teams the first of which is of type ϕ, then the other one is of type ψ.
There are exactly two teams with empty domain, namely ∅ and {∅}. From these we get exactly four different types of teams with empty domain:
Symbol
Type Teams
These dependence values form the following diamond:
Suppose ϕ is a type of a team with empty domain. 4 We define M |= ϕ to mean that the team {∅} is of type ϕ in M. We then say M is of type ϕ.
In a sense, team logic is a four-valued logic. The dependence values of types ϕ ⊗ ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ, and ∼ ϕ for types ϕ and ψ of teams with empty domain can be readily given in terms of truth-tables:
Here are some examples of types: The type
is the type of teams in which field 1 depends on field 0 in the weaker sense than functional dependence that the values of field 0 determine at most two values one of which is the value in field 1. Table 5 . Does salary depend on rank?
a team which is of type =(Rank, Salary) ⊗ =(Rank, Salary). If we denote =(x 0 , x 1 ) by ϕ, we get weaker and weaker forms of functional dependence by considering the types
is the type of teams in which field 0 depends functionally on field 1 and conversely field 1 depends functionally on field 0. We could say that fields 0 and 1 are mutually functionally dependent. The type
is the type of teams in which each agent s which satisfies s(0) = s(1) also satisfies s(2) = s(3). The type
is the type of teams in which each agent s which satisfies s(0) = s(1) also satisfies s(2) = s(3) and vice versa. The type
is the type of teams which are non-empty if and only the underlying set M is either infinite or finite and of even cardinality. The type
is the type of teams which are non-empty if and only if in the underlying structure M the predicate P and Q satisfy |P M | ≤ |Q M |.
Modes of dependence and independence
We shall now use the above concept of dependence type to analyze in more general terms different concepts of dependence and independence. Let X be a team with domain {m 1 , . . . , m n } in a domain M , as in Table 1 . There is an obvious partial order in the powerset of {m 1 , . . . , m n }, namely the set-theoretical subset-relation ⊆. We now define a new relation, called the pre-order of functional dependence:
V is functionally dependent on W , i.e. features in V can be determined if the values of the features in W are known. In symbols, ∀s, s ′ ∈ X((∀y ∈ W (s(y) = s ′ (y)) → (∀x ∈ V (s(x) = s ′ (x))))). Equivalently: V is functionally dependent on {w 1 , . . . , w n }, if for all y ∈ V there is a function f y such that for all s in X: s(y) = f y (s(w 1 ), . . . , s(w n )).
It is evident from the definition that the pre-order of functional dependence is weaker than the partial order of inclusion in the sense that every subset of a set obviously depends functionally on the set itself. It is more interesting that sometimes a set is functionally dependent on a set disjoint from itself, and a singleton set may be functionally dependent of another singleton set. Some sets may be functionally dependent on the empty set (in that case the feature has to have a constant value). Every set is certainly functionally dependent on the whole universe.
Note that the Armstrong Axioms of functional dependence (see [Ar74] ) state exactly the following:
1. V ≤ W is a pre-order, i.e. reflexive and transitive.
If
These axioms characterize completely when a functional dependence V ≤ W follows from given functional dependencies V 1 ≤ W 1 ,. . . ,V n ≤ W n . Now we can define two versions of dependence, by using the pre-order of determination. Suppose for W ∩ V = ∅. We define:
There is no U ≥ V such that U ∩V = ∅. In the opposite case V is called determined. Note, that it is quite conceivable that two sets V and W of features are mutually dependent in the sense that both depend on each other. In the team of Table 6 we can make the following observations: star depends on food, since {star}≤{food, drink}. On the other hand, star depends also on music, since {star}≤{drink, music}. So star is not totally dependent on either food or music but it is totally dependent on drink.
Note that the above concepts are defined with respect to the fields that we have in the domain. Indeed, it seems meaningless to define what independence means in a domain where any new fields can be introduced. The new fields can change independence to dependence completely.
Here are some immediate relationships between the introduced concepts of dependence and independence:
1. Every V is totally dependent and totally independent on ∅.
2. If V is (totally) dependent on W , then V is (totally) dependent on every subset of W .
3. If V is dependent on W , it can still be also independent of W , but not totally, unless W = ∅.
4. V is independent of {x} if and only if V is not totally dependent on {x}.
V is totally independent of {x} if and only if V is not dependent on {x}.
If U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } and V = {v 1 , . . . , v m }, let =(U, V ) be the type
This is the type of teams in which V is functionally dependent on U . It is clear that we can define dependence, independence total dependence, total independence, and non-determinedness in terms of the basic types =(U, V ). We suggest that the types of team logic provide a proper framework for an analysis of the variety of different concepts related to dependence.
Team algebra
Let D be a fixed domain and T the set of all teams with domain D. Let us write ϕ ⇔ ψ if every team of type ϕ is of type ψ and vice versa. We call this relation logical equivalence. The Boolean operations ∧, ∨, ∼ together with ⊤ and ⊥ obey usual laws of Boolean algebras, and the mapping h(ϕ) = {X ∈ T : X is of type ϕ}.
is a homomorphism between dependence types, endowed with the operations ∧, ∨ and ∼, and the Boolean algebra of subsets of T :
The operation ⊗ satisfies the laws
For quantifiers we have
The shriek ! commutes with every team operation except ∃:
Obviously, there is a lot more one can say about team algebra.
Some translations
We show that the ∼-free fragment of team logic is equivalent to independence friendly logic. To make our result exact we choose what we believe is the best behaving version of independence friendly logic. This is the dependence friendly logic in which the quantifier ∃x n \t 1 . . . t m ϕ has the meaning "there is a value for x n , functionally depending on what the values of t 1 , . . . , t m are, such that ϕ". In the original independence friendly logic the quantifier ∃x n /∀x 1 . . . ∀x m ϕ had the meaning "there is a value for x n , independently of what the values of x 1 , . . . , x m are, such that ϕ". An attempt to understand what "independently" might mean here led the author to the considerations of Section 4 and eventually to the more basic concept of functional dependence. We can easily define a translation ϕ → ϕ * of dependence friendly logic into team logic, but we have to assume that the formula ϕ of dependence friendly logic is in negation normal form:
It is an immediate consequence of the definitions that for all M, all ϕ, and all X we have M |= X ϕ in dependence friendly logic if and only if X is of type ϕ * .
So we may consider dependence friendly logic a fragment of team logic, and team logic an extension of dependence friendly logic obtained by adding classical negation.
Conversely, we can define a translation ϕ → ϕ + of the ∼-free fragment of team logic into dependence friendly logic:
, where x m1 , . . . , x m k are the free variables of ϕ other than x n (! x n ϕ)
It is again an immediate consequence of the definitions that for all M, all ϕ, and all X we have X is of type ϕ if and only if M |= X ϕ + in dependence friendly logic.
The two translations ϕ → ϕ * and ϕ → ϕ + demonstrate clearly that team logic is built on top of dependence friendly logic, and a fortiori, on top of independence friendly logic. The addition team logic brings to independence friendly logic is classical negation. As this paper shows this addition calls for rather substantial revision of independence friendly logic.
It is well-known 5 that independence friendly logic can be presented in the existential fragment Σ 1 1 of second order logic. If the same presentation is applied to team logic, we go up from Σ 1 1 to the unrestricted second order logic. The proof of the following theorem is an easy adaption of the corresponding result for independence friendly logic in [Ho 1 97a]:
Theorem 6.1. We can associate with every type ϕ(x i1 , . . . , x in ) in vocabulary L a second order sentence η ϕ (U ), where U is n-ary, such that for all L-structures M and teams X with dom(X) = {i 1 , . . . , i n } the following conditions are equivalent 1. X is of type ϕ in M.
(M, X) |= η ϕ (U ).
Corollary 6.2. For every type ϕ there is a second order sentence η ϕ such that for all models M we have M |= ϕ if and only if M |= η ϕ .
With the translation ϕ → η ϕ we can consider team logic a fragment of second order logic, even if the origin of team logic in the dependence relation =(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is totally different from the origin of second order logic, and even if the logical operations of team logic are totally different from those of second order logic.
We could draw many immediate conclusions from Corollary 6.2 and from what is known about second order logic.
We have given a translation of team logic into second order logic. Now we give an implicit translation of second and higher order logic in team logic. The translation is implicit in the sense that it uses new predicates and an extension of the universe. However, the new predicates and the new universe are unique up to isomorphism. We omit the quite standard proof of the following result, which is essentially contained already in [En70] The decision problem of a logic is the problem, with a sentence ϕ as input, whether M |= ϕ for all M. The consistency problem of a logic is the problem, with a sentence ϕ as input, whether M |= ϕ for some M. The Löwenheim number of a logic is the smallest cardinal κ such that for any sentence ϕ, if M |= ϕ for some M, then M |= ϕ for some M of cardinality ≤ κ. The Hanf number of a logic is the smallest cardinal κ such that for any sentence ϕ, if M |= ϕ for some M of cardinality ≥ κ, then M |= ϕ for models M of arbitrarily large cardinality. A logic satisfies the Suslin-Kleene Interpolation Theorem if every model class which is a relativized reduct of a definable model class and whose complement has the same property is itself a definable model class. The ∆-extension of a logic is the smallest extension of it to a logic with the Suslin-Kleene Interpolation Theorem. For more details concerning these concepts we refer to [Ba 6 Fe 0 85].
Corollary 6.5. The decision problems of team logic and second order logic are recursively isomorphic (and Π 2 -complete, see [Vä01] and Footnote 6). They have the same Löwenheim and Hanf numbers. They have the same ∆-extension.
Note that the corresponding corollary for independence friendly logic says: The decision problems of independence friendly logic and second order logic are recursively isomorphic. The consistency problem of independence friendly logic is co-r.e. while that of second order logic is Σ 2 -complete 6 . The Löwenheim and Hanf number of independence friendly logic is ℵ 0 , while the Löwenheim number of second order logic is between the first measurable and the first supercompact cardinals, if such exist, and the Hanf number of second order logic is between the first supercompact and the first extendible cardinal, if such exist (see [Ma 0 71]).
Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game
We now introduce an Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game adequate for team logic and use this game to characterize team logic. This game is nothing else than a "two-directional" version of the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game of independence friendly logic presented in [Vä02] . 6 We use the notation of Lévy [Lé65] . The Σ 0 -formulas, which are at the same time called Π 0 -formulas, are all formulas in the vocabulary {∈} obtained from atomic formulas by the operations ¬, ∨, ∧ and the bounded quantifiers ∃x 0 (x 0 ∈ x 1 ∧ϕ) and ∀x 0 (x 0 ∈ x 1 → ϕ). The Σ n+1 -formulas are obtained from Πn-formulas by existential quantification. The Π n+1 -formulas are obtained from Σn-formulas by existential quantification. A set P ⊆ N is called Σn-definable if there is a Σn-formula ϕ(x 0 ) of set theory such that n ∈ P ⇐⇒ ϕ(n). A problem is called Σn-complete if the set itself is Σn-definable and, moreover, for every Σn-definable set X ⊆ N there is a recursive function f : N → N such that n ∈ X ⇐⇒ f (n) ∈ P. The concepts of a Πn-definable set and a Πn-complete set are defined analogously. After n moves the position (X n , Y n ) is reached and the game ends. Player II is the winner, if X n is of type ϕ in M ⇔ Y n is of type ϕ in N holds for all atomic types ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x in−1 ). Otherwise player I wins.
This is a game of perfect information and the concept of winning strategy is defined as usual. The game is determined by the Gale-Stewart theorem. (1) M ≡ TL N .
(2) For all natural numbers n, player II has a winning strategy in the game EF TL n (M, N ). Using the fact that there are for each n and m, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many types in Type m n , it is easy to prove that a model class K is the class of models of a type in Type (1) K is the class of models of a type of team logic.
(2) There is a natural number n such that K is closed under the relation MRN ⇐⇒ Player II has a winning strategy in EF TL n (M, N ).
We have obtained, after all, a purely game-theoretic definition of team logic.
